

Message Text

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TO CINCUSNAVEUR

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EXDIS MIL ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR:

ADM BAGLEY, CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

ADM TURNER, POLAD, USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES

VADM TURNER, COMSIXTHFLEET

FOLLOWING REPEAT FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY ANKARA TURKEY 7669 DTG

140300Z OCT 75 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO EMBASSY ATHENS

EMBASSY NICOSIA CONSUL ADANA CONSUL ISTANBUL CONSUL IZMIR

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EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF; USNMR SHAPE FOR GEN HAIG AND POLAD;

CINCEUR FOR GEN HYSER AND POLAD; CINCUSAFE FOR GEN ELLIS AND

POLAD

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PFOR, TU

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES AT
CDI'S AND ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

1. MORNING AFTER ELECTIONS (MONDAY, OCTOBER 13) I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. (THE TYPING OF THE MEETING WAS A SURPRISE, AS LAST WEEK I HAD BEEN ADVISED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT IN VIEW OF THE RIGORS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE NECESSITY TO DO SOME INTERNAL HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTING, GOVERNMENT FIGURES WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH ME BEFORE WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15.) THE MEETING BEGAN WITH (A) MY CONGRATULATING CAGLAYANGIL ON HIS REELECTION AS SENATOR, (B) CAGLAYANGIL'S EXPRESSING SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S, SECRETARY KISSINGER'S, AND OTHERS' EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE EMBARGO AND HIS GRATITUDE OVER THE RESULT, (C) OUR DISCUSSING THE PROPOSED VISIT OF SENATOR JAVITS (CAGLAYANGIL WHILE RECALLING HIS LONG AND WARM ASSOCIATION WITH THE SENATOR EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO THE LATTER'S COMING HERE IF HE WAS PLANNING TO COMBINE THIS WITH A SIMILAR VISIT TO ATHENS), AND (D) CAGLAYANGIL'S EXPRESSION OF REGRET OVER THE STONING OF THE ANKARA USIA BUILDING EVENING OF OCTOBER 11 AND THE BOMBINGS AT TWO OTHER AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS IN ANKARA EVENING OCTOBER 12. HAVING EXPRESSED REGRET AND HAVING SAID THAT THESE WERE NOT THE ACTS OF SANE PEOPLE, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THESE SAME GROUPS ARE LIKELY TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS AGAINST DEMIREL (JUSTICE) PARTY'S BUILDINGS BUT NEVER AGAINST ECEVIT'S HEADQUARTERS "BECAUSE THESE ACTIVISTS REGARD THE JUSTICE PARTY AS FRIENDLY TO TURKEY'S ASSOCIATION WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST, WHILE ECEVIT'S PARTY IS LOOKED ON AS BEING OPPOSED TO THESE RELATIONSHIPS." I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE SENDING A NOTE OF CONCERN ON THE SUBJECT TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE BUT AT THE SAME TIME I WISHED TO EXPRESS TO HIM OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE PROMPT POLICE RESPONSE IN ALL THREE INCIDENTS.

2. WE THEN TURNED TO THE MAIN SUBJECT OF OUR MEETING. I NOTED THAT NOW THAT THE EMBARGO WAS LIFTED AND THE ELECTIONS WERE PAST THE USG WAS EXTREMELY HOPEFUL THAT THERE COULD BE AN IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF THE SECURITY
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ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE CURRENTLY SUSPENDED AT OUR COMMON DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS (CDI'S), AND THAT THE PROMISED TURKISH FLEXIBILITY ON CYPRUS WOULD SOON BE FORTHCOMING. CAGLAYANGIL EVINced NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE CYPRUS PORTION OF MY COMMENT. WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC AS TO DETAILS, HE INDICATED THAT THE GOT COULD NOW SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND THIS WOULD BE INITIATED BY ITS AGREEING TO A RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS. (AS OUR CONVERSATION PROGRESSED, AIDES CONTINUED TO BRING HIM ELECTION RESULTS WHICH HE INTERRUPTED TO READ ALOUD. THESE PERIODIC BULLETINS SUGGESTED A TREND WHICH WAS ON BALANCE FAVORABLE TO HIS JUSTICE PARTY. EVEN BEFORE THESE BULLETINS BEGAN ARRIVING, HOWEVER, HE HAD SAID IN RESPONSE TO MY DIRECT QUERY THAT THE WEAKENING OF THE MINOR PARTIES AND THE STRENGTHENING

OF THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES STRENGTHENED THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT CYPRUS.) I ASKED HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE ITS POST-ELECTION, POST-EMBARGO LIFTING DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO NEXT MOVES ON CYPRUS, AND CAGLAYANGIL REPLIED, "BY ABOUT A WEEK FROM TODAY." THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION THEN ENDED WITH MY STRESSING, IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 2ND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, THE IMPORTANCE TO OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP OF TURKEY'S NOW SHOWING FLEXIBILITY ON THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE EARLIER THE GOT COULD ACT THE BETTER, NOTING THAT TO MOVE NOW WOULD BE TO DO SO IN THE WAKE OF CONGRESS'S HAVING BACKED OFF FROM ITS INITIAL POSITION -- WHEREAS IF A NUMBER OF WEEKS WENT BY WE WOULD THEN PROBABLY BE FACING SOME NEW U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTION WHICH WOULD PLACE TURKEY ONCE AGAIN IN THE POSITION OF SEEMING TO BE UNDER OUTSIDE PRESSURE.

3. OUR CONVERSATION NEXT TURNED TO THE REACTIVATION OF THE SUSPENDED ACTIVITIES AT THE CDI'S, AND HERE CAGLAYANGIL'S REMARKS IMMEDIATELY BECAME NEGATIVE AND DISCOURAGING. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROVISIONAL STATUS (UNDER WHICH THE CDI ACTIVITIES ARE SUSPENDED) WAS DESIGNED BY THE GOT TO BE IN FORCE UNTIL A NEW DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED, NOT SIMPLY UNTIL THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN LIFTED. THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BEGIN, HOWEVER, IN THE GOT'S VIEW, UNTIL THE EMBARGO HAD BEEN LIFTED. THEREFORE, THE FIRST PROBLEM BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT NOW, HE SAID, WAS TO DECIDE WHETHER THE EMBARGO HAD IN FACT BEEN LIFTED --

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AND FOR THE NEXT FEW MINUTES HE PROCEEDED TO ARGUE THAT IT HAD NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN. UNDER THE LEGISLATION JUST PASSED BY THE CONGRESS, HE NOTED, IT WAS STILL IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO BUY CERTAIN ITEMS (THOSE FOUND ONLY IN U.S. GOVERNMENT ARSENALS) THAT WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUED FUNCTIONING OF THOSE FORCES. THE TURKISH NAVY PARTICULARLY WAS STILL OPERATING UNDER THE EMBARGO BECAUSE A NUMBER OF KEY ITEMS IT NEEDED COULD BE FOUND ONLY IN U.S. ARSENALS. AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN US, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMED TO BACK OFF THIS POSITION. HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT DO SO DIRECTLY, BUT BY INDICATING LATER IN THE CONVERSATION THAT THE GOT WOULD WANT TO BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT AT ONCE. CAGLAYANGIL SHOWED NO GIVE, HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE REACTIVATION OF THE INSTALLATIONS PENDING THE COMPLETION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THIS LED TO A PROLONGED EXCHANGE BETWEEN US. I EMPHASIZED THAT AFTER THE CONGRESS HAD "BACKED OFF" FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION IN LARGE PART ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS, IT WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED STATES IF THE CDI ACTIVITIES -- SO IMPORTANT TO NATO AND TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE -- WERE NOT PROMPTLY REACTIVATED. WE

DID NOT EXPECT THE SITUATION TO REVERT TO THE FEBRUARY 5 STATUS QUO ANTE AND WE WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD STILL HAVE TO PREVAIL UNTIL A REVISED OVERALL AGREEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED, BUT WE COULD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND THESE INSTALLATIONS NOT BEING PERMITTED TO OPERATE AT ALL. I POINTED OUT THE VERY REAL PROBLEM OF CONTINUING TO KEEP HIGHLY TRAINED PERSONNEL IN PLACE AND DOING NOTHING. I SAID IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT NEGOTIATIONS OF A REVISED DEFENSE AGREEMENT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY. I SUGGESTED THAT THE POSITION HE WAS NOW TAKING COULD END UP, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IN FORCING THE EVACUATION OF OUR PERSONNEL -- THE VERY THING THAT TURKEY AND THE U.S. LEADERS HAD UP TO NOW WORKED SO HARD TO HEAD OFF.

5. I POINTED OUT THAT IF THE VOTE WE HAD WON IN OCTOBER HAD BEEN WON IN LATE JULY, THE TURKISH-INSTITUTED PROVISIONAL STATUS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE ALLOWED OUR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING INSTALLATIONS TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION UNDER TURKISH COMMAND TEAMS MUCH AS OUR COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS WERE SECRET

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NOW DOING. I WONDERED WHY, NOW THAT WE HAD WON THE VOTE, THE GOT COULD NOT REVERT TO ITS INITIAL PLAN. IN REPLY CAGLAYANGIL CONCEDED THAT IF THE VOTE HAD BEEN WON IN JULY THE PROVISIONAL STATUS OF THESE INSTALLATIONS WOULD STILL HAVE PERMITTED THEM TO FUNCTION, ALTHOUGH UNDER TURKISH COMMAND TEAMS. HE SAID THAT ONCE THEY HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN, HOWEVER, IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POLITICALLY TO REOPEN THEM -- AND THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIS THAT THE GOT HAD FOR SO MANY MONTHS REFRAINED FROM TAKING THE INITIAL ACTION TO SHUT THEM DOWN. NEXT, HAVING SPOKEN OF SPENDING ALL OF HIS DIPLOMATIC YEARS TRYING TO STRENGTHEN AMERICAN-TURKISH RELATIONS, HE MADE THE POINT THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT A GOT INITIATIVE BUT RATHER A U.S. CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVE THAT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE TERMINATION OF OUR DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE BASES. I TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS LATTER COMMENT. DRAWING ON PORTIONS OF A MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN THE LEGAL DIVISION, I VIGOROUSLY REBUTTED THE ASSERTION THAT THE CONGRESSIONAL EMBARGO CONSTITUTED BY ITSELF A LEGALLY ACCEPTABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR TURKEY'S HAVING ERMINATED THE AGREEMENT, AND I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT OUR MUTUAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, ALTHOUGH TEMPORARILY CHANGED, HAD NEVER BEEN ENTIRELY SUSPENDED ON EITHER OF OUR PARTS. CAGLAYANGIL IN TURN TOOK EXCEPTION TO MY LEGAL ARGUMENTS. WE THEREUPON LEFT THIS PHASE OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT I WOULD SUBMIT A MEMORANDUM ELABORATING ON THE U.S. LEGAL POSITION. NEXT, I EMPHASIZED THAT CONGRESS HAD NOT SIMPLY ACTED OUT OF THE BLUE BUT RATHER IN RESPONSE TO A WIDESPREAD FEELING AMONG ITS OWN MEMBERSHIP AND AMONG MANY OTHER AMERICANS THAT IN CONDUCTING THE SECOND PHASE OF THE MILITARY OPERATION ON CYPRUS TURKEY HAD CLEARLY VIOLATED ITS AGREEMENTS WITH US CONCERNING THE USE OF ARMS SUPPLIED UNDER THE

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER DEFENDED TURKEY'S ACTIONS IN PHASE II, USING THE ARGUMENT THAT THE COMPRESSION OF THE TURKISH TROOPS IN SUCH A SMALL AREA WAS A MILITARILY UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION WHICH NO MILITARY COMMANDER COULD PERMIT, AND THAT THEREFORE WITH THE FAILURE OF GENEVA II, PHASE II OF THE OPERATIONS WAS AN INEVITABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE EXTENSION OF PHASE I. THE FOREIGN MINISTER COMPLAINED THEREFORE ABOUT THE "ILLOGIC" OF THE WILLINGNESS OF MANY OF TURKEY'S CRITICS TO ACCEPT PHASE I OF THE INTERVENTION BUT NOT SECRET

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PHASE II. I SAID THE REASON WAS THAT A GREAT MANY PEOPLE HAD DIFFICULTY IN SEEING WHAT OTHER FORCES THE TURKISH MILITARY FORCE ON CYPRUS HAD TO PREPARE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST IN THE PERIOD AFTER PHASE I AND BEFORE PHASE II. THE UPSHOT IN THE EYES OF MANY HAD BEEN CONQUEST, AND I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT A PROBLEM SIMPLY FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS AND FOR LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BUT FOR A GREAT MANY EUROPEANS AS WELL. THUS, IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE GOT TO ADOPT THE POSITION THAT OPPOSITION TO PHASE II WAS A SOMEHOW INEXPLICABLE REACTION OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WAS A VERY STRONGLY HELD VIEW AMONG ALMOST ALL OF TURKEY'S FRIENDS. THIS PORTION OF OUR CONVERSATION ENDED WITH CAGLAYANGIL AGREEING THAT PHASE II WAE A SOURCE OF MUCH DIFFICULTY FOR TURKEY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH MANY OTHERS BESIDES THE U.S. CONGRESS.

7. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NEXT SAID THAT IF I WAS ASKING OFFICIALLY THAT THE CDI'S BE REACTIVATED HE WOULD CARRY THE MATTER TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND I SHOULD REGARD WHAT HE WAS SAYING TO ME IN TODAY'S MEETING AS INFORMAL AND PERSONAL VIEWS. I SAID THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT COUCHED IN TERMS OF "MAKING AN OFFICIAL REQUEST" BUT RATHER THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER IN MY LAST MEETING WITH HIM HAD ASKED ME TO ENSURE THAT HE (CAGLAYANGIL) PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THESE INSTALLATIONS OPEN PROMPTLY, BOTH IN TERMS OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS AND OUR COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS. CAGLAYANGIL THEN SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND U.S. CONCERN IF NOTHING WERE PERMITTED TO START ON THE SUSPENDED CDI'S UNTIL THE NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT WAS COMPLETELY NEGOTIATED. THIS, HE AGREED, WOULD TAKE A VERY LONG TIME AND WOULD RESULT IN PERSONNEL REMAINING IDLE BEYOND WHAT WERE PRACTICAL LIMITS. A WAY OUT OF OUR DILEMMA, HE SUGGESTED, WOULD BE FOR US TO AGREE THAT A START-UP DATE WOULD NOT HAVE TO AWAIT THE HAMMERING OUT OF ALL DETAILS OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP. IF WE COULD AGREE ON THE ESSENTIALS OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP (AND HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE NEW RELATIONSHIP WOULD HAVE TO HAVE GUARANTEES AGAINST NEW CONGRESSIONAL "SURPRISES"), THEN HE SAID WE COULD GET THE INSTALLATIONS GOING AGAIN AND NOT WAIT FOR THE MANY ADDITIONAL MONTHS IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE TO HAMMER OUT THE DETAILS OF A NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT. I SAID THAT I THOUGH IT WAS UNREALISTIC

TO THINK THAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT ON
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ANYTHING AS SIGNIFICANT AND AS SWEEPING AS HE WAS SUGGESTING IN
A SHORT TIME FRAME. I THEREFORE REMAINED DEEPLY DISCOURAGED BY
WHAT HE WAS SAYING BECAUSE, I REPEATED, HE WAS RAISING A REAL
POSSIBILITY THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WE WOULD SOON HAVE TO
BEGIN REMOVING OUR TECHNICAL PEOPLE FROM THE SCENE. THESE
WERE TECHNICIANS WHO HAD ALREADY REMAINED IDLE TOO LONG,
AND THEIR DEPARTURE WOULD MEAN THE BEGINNING OF THE VERY EVACUATION
THAT, I AGAIN STRESSED, WE BOTH HAD WORKED SO HARD AND SO LONG
TO PREVENT. CAGLAYANGIL DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS DIRECTLY.
INSTEAD, ONCE AGAIN REFERRED TO HIS LONG COMMITMENT
TO THE PRESERVING OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS. HE THEN
ENDED HIS COMMENTS BY SAYING: "DO NOT BE DISCOURAGED;
WE WILL FIND A WAY".

8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE CAGLAYANGIL ENTERED THIS MORNING'S
DISCUSSION CONVINCED THAT THE GOT SHOULD GIVE FAIRLY EARLY
EVIDENCE OF INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION
BUT NOT REPEAT NOT YET IN A POSTION TO KNOW THE PRECISE
DEGREE AND SHAPE OF THAT FLEXPBILITY. I THINK HE ALSO
ENTERED THE CONVERSATION FEELING THAT REACTIVATION OF U.S.
ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED ON THE CDI'S WOULD HAVE
TO WAIT FOR SOME TIME, AND PRESUMABLY UNTIL NEGOTIATION OF A
BASIC NEW DEFENSE AGREEMENT WITH US HAD BEEN COMPLETED. I
THINK HE STILL LEANS TO THIS LATTER VIEW, ALTHOUGH I AM SURE HE
IS TROUBLED BY THE STRENGTH OF MY REACTION.

9. WHAT IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME IS A WASHINGTON DECISION AS
TO JUST HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR US TO GET THESE INSTALLATIONS
GOING AGAIN NOW, AND CONSEQUENTLY HOW MUCH BEHIND THE SCENE
PRESSURE WE SHOULD PUT ON THE TURKS TO ACCOMPLISH
THIS. IF WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT GET CDI'S IN OPERATION QUICKLY, AND
INSTEAD THEIR START-UP IS TIED TO THE CONCLUSION OF EVEN
THE FUNDAMENTAL PORTIONS OF THE UPCOMING NEGOTIATION, THIS
WOULD REPRESENT SUCH A SIGNIFICANT FURTHER DELAY THAT AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER WE WILL IN THE INTERIM HAVE HAD TO
DISMANTLE MUCH OF THE OPERATING-PERSONNEL PORTION OF OUR TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORT HERE. (THIS PROCESS IS ALREADY
SIGNIFICANTLY UNDER WAY. NO NEW TECHNICIANS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO
COUNTRY UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY WOULD ARRIVE HERE
TO DO NOTHING. NO TECHNICIANS PRESENTLY
HERE HAVE BEEN SENT HOME BEFORE COMPLETION OF THEIR TOURS
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BUT MANY ARE ON UNACCOMPANIED ONE-YEAR TOURS AND AS THE
MONTHS GO ON MORE AND MORE OF THESE ARE COMPLETING THEIR
ASSIGNMENTS, GOING HOME AND NOT BEING REPLACED.) MOREOVER, I ASSUME
THAT THE CONTINUED SHUTDOWN OF THESE INSTALLATIONS WOULD REPRESENT

A SERIOUS NEGATIVE IN OUR FUTURE DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, TO REACTIVATE THE CDI'S IN RETURN FOR THE CONGRESS' ONLY PARTIAL LIFTING OF ITS FEBRUARY 5 PENALTIES PRESENTS A DIFFICULT POLITICAL BURDEN FOR THE GOT, AND THIS IS CLEARLY PART OF CAGLAYANGIL'S MOTIVE FOR TAKING THE POSITION HE SPELLED OUT IN TODAY'S MEETING. (HE IS ALSO MOTIVATED, HOWEVER, BY A WISH TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON US TO REACH A NEW AGREEMENT, WHICH HE THINKS WOULD BE LOST ONCE THESE INSTALLATIONS START TO FUNCTION AGAIN.)

10. AS A RESULT OF MY REMARKS THIS MORNING I THINK CAGLAYANGIL WILL, WITHOUT FURTHER U.S. INITIATIVES, REVIEW THE CDI POSITION HE PRESENTED. HOWEVER, I AM NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THAT REVIEW. THEREFORE, IF WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO GET THESE ACTIVITIES RESTORED PROMPTLY, I RECOMMEND THAT THREE FURTHER INITIATIVES BE TAKEN. FIRST, I RECOMMEND THAT A PERSONAL MESSAGE BE SENT FROM THE SECRETARY OR THE PRESIDENT TO CAGLAYANGIL OR DEMIREL STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE, BOTH ON MUTUAL SECURITY AND OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS GROUNDS, OF REACTIVATING THESE INSTITUTIONS UNDER SOME KIND OF CONTINUING BUT ALTERED PROVISIONAL STATUS. SECOND, I SUGGEST THAT GENERAL HAIG COMMUNICATE THE SAME SENTIMENTS PRIVATELY BUT PROMPTLY TO GENERAL SANCAR. THIRD, AMBASSADOR ESENBEL SHOULD BE CALLED TO THE DEPARTMENT TO RECEIVE, AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL, THE SAME MESSAGE.

11. AS FOR CYPRUS, MY CONCERNS ARE THAT (A) CAGLAYANGIL CONTINUES TO BE UNSPECIFIC AND THAT (B) WHAT THE GOT WILL THINK IS BEING FLEXIBLE WILL NOT APPEAR SO TO OTHERS. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT OUR WISEST COURSE FOR THE MOMENT, IN VIEW OF WHAT CAGLAYANGIL SIAD, IS TO HOLD OFF UNTIL WE SEE WHETHER PROMPT AND ADEQUATE TURKISH ACTION IS FORTHCOMING. IF TEN DAYS FROM NOW WE ARE ENCOUNTERING FOOT-DRAGGING, THAT WOULD BE THE TIME TO CONSIDER A FURTHER INTERVENTION ON THIS SUBJECT.
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